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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Specht respectfully submits this Reply Brief to address and rebut issues raised by
the Town of Big Water (the "Town") in its Brief dated May 16, 2016 (the "Brief'), and
submits that there are three reasons to reject the arguments of the Town:
1. Specht adequately marshalled the evidence to show that the Town's decision
was arbitrary and capricious. The record was only 59 pages long, and Specht included
the relevant citations in his Opening Brief ("Specht's Brief'). Specht discussed and analyzed the factual record in detail in his opening papers, and showed why none of the information Hyde presented support his claim for either the Variance or the Reduction.
2.

The Town does not have the requisite substantial evidence necessary to meet

the various statutory requirements for granting the Variance or the Reduction. The Town
also concedes that it failed to comply with the statutory notice requirements. Its sole argument - that Specht knew of the hearing and thus cannot argue a lack of notice - fails
because the entire community was entitled to notice so that everyone could participate in
this matter of public interest. The fact that Specht happened to attend the meeting is per
se

insufficient.

3.

The Town's action was purely legislative and thus allowed Specht to pro-

ceed directly to court without exhausting administrative remedies. The actions in question were taken by the Town Council, and memorialized in an Ordinance. Notably, the
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text of the Ordinance states that the Town also explicitly considered the "general interest," thus indicating that it weighed competing public policies, a hallmark of legislative
action. The modification of a public cul-de-sac and modifications of a zoning ordinance,

lil

moreover, are fundamentally legislative acts.
For the reasons set out herein and those set forth in Specht's Brief, this Court
should overrule the Trial Court's denial of Specht's motion for summary judgment and
hold that the Town's actions in all respects were arbitrary, capricious, and illegal.
ARGUMENT

I.

Specht Has Adequately Marshalled The Record

Specht has properly and appropriately pointed out the paucity of factual support,
the lack of factual findings by the Trial Court, and the fundamental illegality of the
Town's actions. Specht's Brief sets out the underlying facts in a Statement of Facts and
analyzes those facts in connection with each of Specht's claims. Specht cannot be
blamed for the sparse record, or the fact that the record fails to support the Town's action.
'iiJ

(R. 26-27.) Indeed, the paucity of the record requires that the Trial Court's decision be
reversed. In Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, 'if 20, 217 P .3d 733, 742, this Court
recognized the duty to present the evidence admitted at trial that supports the findings being challenged on appeal. However, the Supreme Court clarified this duty in State v.
Nielsen, 2014 UT 10,326 P.3d 645. There, the Supreme Court explained that the obliga-

2
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~

tion to "marshal" the evidence is not a matter of procedural compliance, but rather a burden to analyze the evidence to show that the trial court made a mistake. See id

,r,r 33-44.

Specht has done what the Supreme Court requires. Specht's Brief sets forth the "facts"
that could support the Town's action at pages 9 through 12, and the body of his Brief
demonstrates that the materials presented to the Town do not support the Trial Court's
conclusion. As the Town pointed out in it's Brief, moreover, the record is sparse in both
scope and content. Indeed, the record before the Town consisted of a scant 59 pages, all
of which are in the record. (See R. 26-78 or 938-998 (the "Town's Record".) The very
lack of an adequate record and factual foundation supports Specht's position that the
Town's actions were arbitrary and capricious.
The Town has suggested that if Specht somehow failed in his duty to marshal evidence, Specht can be effectively defaulted on appeal. This is simply not true. In State v.

Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P.3d 645, the Supreme Court ruled that there is no default attached with a perceived failure to marshal. The obligation to summarize the adversary's
evidence is not a procedural obligation that results in a default or prevents this Court
from reaching the merits of the case. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,r,r 40-41. At its essence, the
obligation to marshal goes to the burden of persuasion. Id. at ,r 41. This in turn goes to
the heart of an appeal, which is to focus on the merits of the case. Schreib v. Whitmer,
2016 UT App 61,

,r 28, 2016 Utah App. LEXIS 65, *19-20.

"If appellant does not meet

3
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the burden, through marshaling or otherwise, the appellant's burden to persuade the appellate court is not met." Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ,r,r 17-19. Specht took the scant
information in the record and demonstrated that the evidence simply does not support the
conclusions made by the Town. Rather than be "defaulted," Specht should in fact prevail.
II.

Both the Variance And The Reduction Were Illegal
A.

The Evidence Does Not Support The Variance

As previously noted, the Town's Record consists of a mere 59 pages. As Specht
showed in his Brief, moreover, the Town Record contains no facts that can support the
necessary conclusions for the Town's issuance of the Variance. The only evidence submitted in support of the request for the Variance is found in the transcript of the July 20,
2014 variance hearing. (R. 1062-1072.) This evidence fails to show that enforcement of
the applicable zoning regulations were an "unreasonable hardship," and further fails to
show that any hardship Hyde experienced due the size of his lot was different from the
hardship experienced by every other property owner in the subdivision.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-707 (now UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-702(2)(a)) (the
"Code") sets forth the factors that must exist in order to grant a variance. These required
elements are:
(i) literal enforcement of the zoning ordinance would cause an unreasonable hardship for the applicant that is not necessary to carry out the
general purpose of the zoning ordinance;
4
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(ii) there are special circumstances attached to the property that do not
generally apply to other properties in the same district;
(iii) granting the variance is essential to the enjoyment of a substantial
property right possessed by other property in the same district;
(iv) the variance will not substantially affect the general plan and will
not be contrary to the public interest; and
(v) the spirit of the zoning ordinance is observed and substantial justice
done.
(emphases added).
In order to determine if the hardship criteria are met, the Town may not find an
unreasonable hardship unless the alleged hardship is both (A) located on or associated
with the property for which the variance is sought; and (B) comes from circumstances
peculiar to the property, not from conditions that are general to the neighborhood.
UTAH CODE ANN. §10-9-707(ii). In addition, the Town was prohibited from finding an
unreasonable hardship if the hardship was self-imposed. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 10-9707(ii). Further, the Town was permitted to find special circumstances only if those circumstances related to the hardship complained of and deprived the subject property of
the privileges granted to other properties in the same district. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9707(iii). Perhaps most importantly, the Hydes bore the "burden of proving that all of
the conditions justifying a variance have been met." UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-707. "Unless an applicant proves all of these elements, a variance may not be approved." Krejci v.
City ofSaratoga Springs, 2013 UT 74, P36, 322 P.3d 662,669.
5
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•
In support of his variance request, Hyde admitted that all of the lots in his subdivi-

•

sion were under the ¼ acre requirement for the zone in which his property was located.
(R. 1065.) The size of Hyde 's lot thus was not unique to him, but was a common situation in the entire subdivision. Hyde also stated that the size of his lot did not prohibit him
from building any home, or even a 1,200 square foot home. He simply could not design a
home that would allow for houseboat parking. (R. 1064, 1066.) This is insufficient for a

•

variance. As a final claim of hardship, Hyde indicated that if he was not granted the Variance, he would have been required to build his deck without the vertical covering that he
wanted, because that covering would subject the deck to the applicable setback requirements. (R. 1067.)
Rather than make findings of fact as to each of the elements required under UTAH
CODE ANN. §10-9-707, the Town, and later the Trial Court, simply determined that granting the variance "would not hurt anyone .. .." This determination was insufficient to
grant a variance under UTAH CODE ANN. §10-9-707 and in granting the variance, the
Town exceeded its authority. In Wells v. Board ofAdjustment ofSalt Lake City Corp.,
936 P .2d 1102, 1104 (Utah App.1997), this Court found that the municipal board "overstepped its legislatively delegated authority" when it granted a variance without making
that statutorily required findings. There, the municipal board determined that the variance was appropriate because "the neighborhood would be better served." Id. at 1104.
This Court determined there that the variance was illegal. Here, where the Trial Court
6
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•

Gj

decided that the Variance was appropriate because it was "not hurting anyone," this Court
should again find the Variance illegal.
Importantly, the Town is wrong in its statement that "[i]f the official record
demonstrates that the Board considered all of the above criteria, the Court should affirm
the Board's decision." (Town's Brief, p. 26 (emphasis added).) The Trial Court made
this same error when it found that "the board considered all of the required factors." (R.
1177 (emphasis added).) The standard is not "consideration" of the Code factors, but rather proof that the factors are met. Krejci, 2013 UT 74,, 36. Even assuming that the
Town considered each of the statutory criteria, since the facts did not support the existence of each element, the Variance is illegal.
The Trial Court points to pages 36 and 37 of the Record and claims that they support the mandatory Code requirements. These pages are in the minutes of the Town's
July 20, 2004 Board of Adjustment. Other than Hyde's Application for Variance (the
"Application") at pages 50-11 of the Record, it is the only location where any evidence
supporting the Variance is found. In truth, though, evidence supporting the Town's actions is not found here, or anywhere else in the Town's Record. The Town considered
self-serving statements from Hyde that the driveway to his property will be "too steep" if
he is not allowed to move his buildings closer to the rear of his property. (R. 40.) Hyde
claims, and Town Board member Alexander restates, that some other resident raised the

7
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height of the cul-de-sac by four feet. There is no evidence anywhere in the record to support these claims, and even if there was, the height of the cul-de-sac has no connection to
the need for a variance. How steep is too steep? No person testified or presented any information regarding the proper limits of steepness for a residential driveway in Big Water, Utah.
Noteworthy are the claims of special condition noted in the Application. Both the

(j)

needs for a septic system and the existence of a well on the property are pre-existing conditions that were in place when Hyde purchased is property. (R. 52-53.) All the other
lots in his subdivision also need septic systems, and all the other lots are ¼ acre like
Hydes. (R. 46.) The Record contains no evidence that any of the other property owners
needed a variance to construct their homes or install their septic systems. If Hyde's lot is
the same as all the other lots as he claims, no hardship existed warranting the issuance of
the Variance. Hyde's subjective perspective that his driveway would be "too steep" is
simply not enough.
It is clear that the Record in its entirety does not support the Trial Court's Decision. Findings cannot be made "sub silentio" when not supported by substantial evidence. Wells, 936 P.2d at 1105. Here, the Town's Record does not contain factual evidence sufficient to find the existence of each of the five factors set forth in the Code.
Overall, Hyde: (i) did not show that enforcement of the zoning rules would cause an unreasonable hardship for him that was unnecessary to effect the general purpose of those
8
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~

rules; (ii) did not show that his property was subject to special circumstances that did not
affect other properties (rather, he stated that all the properties in the subdivision were less
than½ acre); (iii) did not prove that the variance was essential to the enjoyment of some
substantial property right that other property owners enjoyed that he could not; (iv) did
not prove that the variance would not substantially affect the general plan of zoning or
negatively impact the public; and (v) did not provide evidence to show that the spirit of
the zoning ordinance would be observed and that substantial justice would be done.
Hyde simply showed that his lot was the same as all the other undersized lots in the subdivision, and yet all the other property owners managed to build on those lots without a
variance. R. 45-47. Based on the facts and evidence before it, the Town lacked authority
under the Code to issue the Variance. The Town's action was therefore wrongful and illegal, and should be reversed. See Wells, 936 P.2d at 1105 (variance issued without substantial evidence supporting statutory criteria must be reversed).

B.

The Reduction Is Illegal

The Reduction in the cul-de-sac is illegal because no good cause exists for that action. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 10-9-808 (2004) states that a cul-de-sac can be vacated or
amended only after the planning commission issues a recommendation and only when,
after considering the planning commission's recommendation, the Town's legislative
body "is satisfied that neither the public or any person shall be materially injured by the

9
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proposed vacation ... and that there is good cause for the vacation... " UTAH CODE ANN.§
10-9-810 (2004 ).
"Good cause" is a relative and highly abstract term, and its meaning must be determined not only by verbal context of statute in which term is employed but also by context
of action and procedures involved in type of case presented." Wray v. Folsom, 166 F.
Supp. 390, 394, 395 (W.D. Ark. 1958).
By any definition, no good cause exists for the Reduction. The Hydes knowingly
purchased an undersized lot that did not meet the planning and zoning requirements for
the home they wanted. The cul-de-sac is a public street that all citizens are entitled to
use. The Town heard specific evidence that the Reduction would negatively impact other
uses of the cul-de-sac, since certain vehicles owned by residents who lived there needed
the full radius of the unaltered cul-de-sac in order to maneuver their vehicles. (R. 39, 56,
708-710, 907-910.) The Hydes' reasons for a reduction are insufficient to meet the requisite legal standard for good cause and to overcome the harm to the other users of the cul~

de-sac.
Other jurisdictions have found that good cause does not exist to reduce or alter the
size and shape of a public cul-de-sac when one property owner seeks a change for his
own benefit that will impact the rights of others. In Starling v. Lake Meade Prop. Owners Ass'n, 121 A.3d 1021, 1029 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015), a Pennsylvania trial court found
that it would be wrongful to reduce the size of a public cul-de-sac to meet the needs of
10
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one property owner who was trying to protect the use of her own adjacent property. Specifically, that court determined that the requested action was improper because the reduction "would impair the vested property right of ingress and egress over [the road] enjoyed
by all property owners in the [subdivision]." Id. at 1029. The law regarding zoning and
subdivisions also provided that the "platted roads in a recorded subdivision plan constitute right of ways for purposes of ingress and egress running to the benefit all subdivision
property owners." Id.
The rationale in Starling holds true here. The cul-de-sac at issue is a public way
that benefits all of the property owners in the subdivision specifically, and all of the
members of the Big Water community generally. At the very least, to the extent that the
Town believed it heard substantial evidence from Hyde as to why the cul-de-sac should
be reduced, the Town heard conflicting and equally substantial evidence as to the negative impact of the Reduction. Had the Town given proper notice of a street vacation,
prior to the cul-de-sac reduction by the Hyde's, it would have had the opportunity to
properly consider the opposition of members of the community. The Town's Record
makes clear that the Town did not undertake any review on its own as to the appropriateness of the Reduction, gave no consideration to testimony regarding the negative impact
of the Reduction and most importantly, gave no consideration to, and made no finding of

11
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good cause, as required by UTAH CODE ANN.§ 10-9-810. 1 This section prohibits the reduction of a cul-de-sac without a finding of good cause. Yet, the Town indicated in the
Ordinance that "this vacation will not be detrimental to the general interest of the Town
of Big Water." (R. 67.) It is impossible to locate any evidence in the Record that could
support such a determination. Without factual support, any determination by the Town
that the Reduction would "not be detrimental to the general interest of the Town of Big
Water" is per se arbitrary.

C.

The Town Failed To Meet The Statutory Notice Requirements

There is no evidence that any of the property owners in the subdivision consented
to the Hyde's actions, and there is specific evidence that at least one property owner,
Specht, objected to Hyde's activities. As a result, UTAH CODE ANN.§ 10-9a-608(b)(5)
(as in effect in 2004) required that public notice be given of Hyde's intended (and prior to
any alteration being undertaken) Reduction. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-207(1 )(b) also
required that the general public, not just Specht, receive notice of the town hearings. As
~

a public road, the alteration of the cul-de-sac affected all of the residents of the Town.
All of those residents were entitled to notice and a chance to speak. As the Record

1

It is important to note that the Hyde's took actions to reduce the cul-de-sac without first

seeking permission.
12
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demonstrates, the required statutory notice was not provided and the voices of those residents were never heard.
The purpose of these Code sections is to "ensure that members of the public receive adequate notice of ordinances that may affect their property." Hatch v. Boulder
Town Council, 2001 UT App 55,, 12, 21 P.3d 245,248. 2 Obviously, the public has a

fundamental interest in the adequate notice of a proposed land use action. Suarez v.
Grand County, 2012 UT 72,, 75, 296 P.3d 688. Adequate notice exists when municipal-

ities have "complied with statutory requirements," which and must be "reasonably calculated to appraise a person of an action ... [and] sufficient to permit an objection." Id at
,, 67, 70. The Town's ability to issue both the Variance and the Reduction is possible
only through the authority conferred by the applicable statutes. "As such, 'cities must
strictly comply with the statute delegating them the authority to act.'" Hatch, 2001 UT
App 55,, 7. The Town's "failure to strictly follow the statutory requirements in enacting
the ordinance renders it invalid." Id. (citing Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180,

2

In Hatch, the Town of Boulder sought to enact an ordinance that created new zoning

districts. The Town did not present a map showing the new zones that was referenced in
a proposed ordinance. The ordinance subsequently adopted was overturned for lack of
proof of a proper map.
13
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183 (Utah 1986)3). The Town must have adhered to the letter of the applicable statutes in
order for its actions regarding the Variance and the Reduction to be valid. Here, because
Hyde's request for the Variance and the Reduction lacked the consent of everyone affected, the Town was required to hold a public hearing with at least ten days' advance
mailed written notice. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-608(b)(5) (2004); id. § 10-9a-207(1)(b)
and (2). Because the Record makes clear that the Town did not follow any of the applicable notice requirements, the issuance of the Variance and the Reduction are invalid.
The Town has claimed that "Big Water was not required to give any notice" of the
public hearings, even though it states that under the inapplicable. (Town's Brief, p. 38.)
However, under UTAH CODE ANN.§ 10-9-808, it was required to provide "prior notice."
Further, and even more absurd, the Town has claimed that even if it were required to give
notice, the issue is moot because Specht had notice of the meeting and argued against the
reduction. (Town's Brief, p. 38.)

~
3

In Call, the appellants challenged an ordinance enacted flood impact fees when that spe-

cific ordinance was not the subject of a noticed public hearing. The City contended that a
general city council meeting that generally discussed the fee issue was enough to satisfy
the statutory notice and public hearing requirements. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed
and held that the ordinance was invalid because notice was not given and a public hearing
was not held.
14
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Specht's appearance at the hearings, however, does not negate the Town's obligation to provide notice in accordance with the requirements of the statutes. Specht is not
the only resident of the subdivision, and his appearance does nothing to relieve the Town
of its responsibility to meet its statutory obligations to the other residents. As a public
road, moreover, the cul-de-sac exists not just for the residents of the subdivision residents, but for the members of the Big Water community as a whole. These interested
parties include public works and other municipal officials, as well as fire, police, and
other life safety professionals. None of those parties received notice, and the resulting
decision must be overturned due to the Town's failure to strictly comply with the statutory notice requirements.
As the cases cited above demonstrate, Utah cities and towns must strictly abide by
notice requirements and ensure that the citizens have an opportunity to be heard. Anyone
who would be affected by the Variance and Reduction was entitled to adequate notice of
the actions the Town was considering. It offends notions of property rights and due process that the Town would take any land use actions without providing adequate notice to
stake holders. Put another way, the Town's failure to provide notice as required by the
applicable statutes is offensive to individual property rights and fundamental due process.
The Town's lack of statutory compliance was thus illegal and renders void both the Variance and Reduction.

Ill
15
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III.

The Town's Actions Were Purely Legislative
The standard for deciding whether a municipal action is legislative or administra-

tive was clearly set out in Carter v. Lehi City, 2012 UT 2, 'il 36, 269 P.3d 141. In Carter,
the Court explained that legislative power generally (a) involves the promulgation of laws
of general applicability; and (b) is based on the weighing of broad, competing policy considerations. Carter, 2012 UT 2, 'iJ 34. This power is different from the executive power,
which encompasses prosecutorial or administrative acts aimed at applying the law to particular individuals or groups based on individual facts and circumstances. Id. It is also
distinguished from the judicial power, which involves the application of the law to particular individuals or groups based on their particularized circumstances. Id.
The legislative power is first defined by the work product it generates. When the
~

government legislates, it establishes rules of general applicability. These rules apply to
everyone who engages in the type of conduct that the law addresses: "When a legislative
body, whether of the state or of a local government, enacts a statute or an ordinance, that
law applies to everyone within the geographical area over which that body has jurisdiction" or to everyone within a "category of persons engaged in a particular activity."

Univ. of Utah v. Shurtleff, 2006 UT 51,125, 144 P.3d 1109. A "generally applicable
rule," in other words, sets the governing standard for all cases coming within its terms.

Carter, 2012 UT 2,136.
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Once the legislature establishes a general rule, its enforcement is left to the executive (by applying it to the particularized circumstances of individuals, through functions
like prosecution or licensing) and its adjudication is left to the judiciary (by resolving
specific disputes between parties as to the applicability of the law to their actions). Id. at
137. The fact that a decision is made by a city council may make it more legislative than
administrative, even if it is site-specific. See, e.g., Mouty v. Sandy City Recorder, 2005
UT 41, 122 P.3d 521 (which Carter specifically cites and approves). 4 The reduction of
the cul-de-sac in this case was by ordinance - typically used for legislative matters.
Moreover, the ordinance says that the variance would not impact the "general interest" of
the Town, which suggests a balancing of policy concerns.
The statute providing the Town with the power to reduce the Cul-de-Sac unequivocally states that the reduction action is taken by the legislative body of the Town:
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 10-9a-208. Hearing and notice for proposal to vacate a public
street, right-of-way, or easement.
(1) For any proposal to vacate some or all of a public street, right-of-way,
or easement, the legislative body shall:
(a) hold a public hearing; and
(b) give notice of the date, place, and time of the hearing, as provided in
Subsection (2).
(2) At least 10 days before the public hearing under Subsection (l)(a), the
notice required under Subsection (l)(b) shall be:
(a) mailed to the record owner of each parcel that is accessed by the public
street, right-of-way, or easement;
(b) mailed to each affected entity;

4

Mouty dealt with a council-mayor form of government.
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(c) posted on or near the street, right-of-way, or easement in a manner that
is calculated to alert the public; and
(d) (i) published in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality in
which the land subject to the petition is located; and
(ii) published on the Utah Public Notice Website created in Section 63F-1701.
Even assuming arguendo that that legislative body was somehow not acting in a
legislative capacity, "[t]he crucial test for determining what is legislative and what is administrative is whether the ordinance is one making a new law, or one executing a law already in existence." Keigley v. Bench, 97 Utah 69, 78, 89 P.2d 480 (Utah 1939) (finding
that changes made to an existing ordinance involving the issuance date, maturity date,
and interest rate of certain municipal bonds was a legislative act). As this Court has concluded, " ... the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances is fundamentally a legislative act." Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 2000 UT App 31,, 9, 997 P.2d 321
(considering the appeal of a denial of a re-zone for a specific parcel, this Court determined the City's actions in denying the zoning request to be legislative). As a result, the
Reduction was a legislative action by the Town, and Specht was not required to exhaust
any administrative remedies before initiating his litigation.
The Trial Court indicated that the Reduction was administrative because it
"merely executed or implemented existing law." (See Decision, R. 1177.) In support of
its position, the Trial Court cites R. 19-22 entitled "Chapter 27: Lot Splitting and Subdivision" (the "Zoning Ordinance" as referred to by the Trial Court). This Chapter sets out
the Town's subdivision and cul-de-sac requirements. It contains no provisions regarding
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~

variation of those requirements, and does not provide for the reduction in size of any culde-sac.
Given the text of Chapter 27 (R. 77-78), the Town could not have possibly been
"merely execut[ing] or implement[ing] existing law," because law or authority governing
the Reduction of cul-de-sacs does not exist in the Zoning Ordinance. Rather, the Reduction Ordinance made new law. It did not implement any existing law and it did not modify another ordinance. The Reduction was therefore a wholly legislative action taken by
the Town based on the power given to it by the Utah Constitution.

CONCLUSION
The factual evidence in this case shows that the Town acted wrongfully. The Record conclusively demonstrates that the Town took actions contrary to the applicable statutes. A Variance was issued without satisfaction of statutory of the criteria, a Reduction
was issued without good cause, and both actions were taken without proper notice. This
Court reverse the trial court's decisions and return this matter to the trial court with instructions that summary judgment enter in favor of Specht.

*

*

*

~
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